––––––––––––––––––––––––
Supplying crucial information is one of the oldest tasks of the intelligence services. Through the collection of precise and verified facts, the services endeavour to help decision-makers, the political authorities that is, to become acquainted with the detrimental resources and plans which continue to be the two dimensions of any threat. After obtaining so-called ‘raw’ data, which has not been used or assessed, it has to be analysed and processed and put to good use. Research can be ‘open’ where it relies on a source of information which is legally and freely available (press, radio, books, conferences...) or ‘clandestine’, where it involves protected information. For that, the services do not have a particular preferred method, but combine different modes of action depending on the intended purpose. They can use human means by benefiting from the involvement of local sources, sometimes in the midst of the opposing camp or agents who are targeted, recruited, trained and controlled. Information obtained is also gathered from shadowing or surveillance operations, or even intrusion into a secure site. The interception of communications, encrypted or otherwise, is also a means of collecting information. With the development of new means of communication (telegraphic, radio, cable...) interception, which came about during the First World War, developed considerably during the Second World War, before becoming, during the Cold War, the primary source of intelligence of modern states.
Obtaining information
––––––––––––––––––––––––Supplying crucial information is one of the oldest tasks of the intelligence services. Through the collection of precise and verified facts, the services endeavour to help decision-makers, the political authorities that is, to become acquainted with the detrimental resources and plans which continue to be the two dimensions of any threat. After obtaining so-called ‘raw’ data, which has not been used or assessed, it has to be analysed and processed and put to good use. Research can be ‘open’ where it relies on a source of information which is legally and freely available (press, radio, books, conferences...) or ‘clandestine’, where it involves protected information. For that, the services do not have a particular preferred method, but combine different modes of action depending on the intended purpose. They can use human means by benefiting from the involvement of local sources, sometimes in the midst of the opposing camp or agents who are targeted, recruited, trained and controlled. Information obtained is also gathered from shadowing or surveillance operations, or even intrusion into a secure site. The interception of communications, encrypted or otherwise, is also a means of collecting information. With the development of new means of communication (telegraphic, radio, cable...) interception, which came about during the First World War, developed considerably during the Second World War, before becoming, during the Cold War, the primary source of intelligence of modern states.
Radio transmitter-receiver type SE 90/40, used for the Carthage mission
On 16 October 1943, the Abwehr (German intelligence service) chartered a Focke-Wulf FW 200 Condor departing from Bordeaux-Mérignac and parachuted French agents into Morocco, to carry out sabotage actions in North Africa. Identified before their departure by a clandestine French counterespionage officer, they were arrested as soon as they arrived. Until March 1944, the radio operator transmitted a clever mix of true and false information to the Abwehr.
Second World War
GIFT FROM THE EXTERNAL DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTERESPIONAGE SERVICE (SDECE)
© Musée de l’Armée / Pascal Segrette
On 16 October 1943, the Abwehr (German intelligence service) chartered a Focke-Wulf FW 200 Condor departing from Bordeaux-Mérignac and parachuted French agents into Morocco, to carry out sabotage actions in North Africa. Identified before their departure by a clandestine French counterespionage officer, they were arrested as soon as they arrived. Until March 1944, the radio operator transmitted a clever mix of true and false information to the Abwehr.
Second World War
GIFT FROM THE EXTERNAL DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTERESPIONAGE SERVICE (SDECE)
© Musée de l’Armée / Pascal Segrette
––––––––––––––––––––––––
Clandestine operations have been one of the main components of secret service action since the Second World War. They have been used either in wartime, during confrontation between two armies behind the lines, or in peacetime during conflictual relationships between States, against international organisations and hostile individuals, when diplomatic action is ineffective and traditional military intervention is impossible. In the first case, they help to unbalance and disorientate enemy armies, by non-conventional methods used against their rear action, to reverse the power balance in places where the main effort is engaged. In the second case, they act illegally to counter the positions of a hostile country, without identifying the manoeuvring governments.
Clandestine and subversive operations
––––––––––––––––––––––––Clandestine operations have been one of the main components of secret service action since the Second World War. They have been used either in wartime, during confrontation between two armies behind the lines, or in peacetime during conflictual relationships between States, against international organisations and hostile individuals, when diplomatic action is ineffective and traditional military intervention is impossible. In the first case, they help to unbalance and disorientate enemy armies, by non-conventional methods used against their rear action, to reverse the power balance in places where the main effort is engaged. In the second case, they act illegally to counter the positions of a hostile country, without identifying the manoeuvring governments.
In both cases, these actions are carried out by men and women specially trained in specific, complex know-how related to clandestine operations, essential to the secrecy of the operation and the safety of its agents. Only the secret services are authorised to carry out such operations and are capable of doing so. They intervene in guerilla or resistance movements, offering military support and technical assistance. They also carry out sabotage actions on civil or military installations, often through third parties, plus physical elimination of leaders or opinion leaders.
Complete diving suit equipped with CO2 oxygen cylinders, from the SDECE Action Service
After they left the Arzew naval base in Algeria in 1953, the combat divers from the SDECE Action Service went to Toulon then Collioure, before joining the Aspretto base near Ajaccio in 1960, where the Combat Divers Training Centre (CINC) was formed. For over twenty years, they led port and military installation reconnaissance operations in hostile countries, taking part in clandestine operations all over the world. Following the failure of the Rainbow Warrior operation, the CINC left Corsica and moved to Brittany.
Cold War
DGSE - MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
After they left the Arzew naval base in Algeria in 1953, the combat divers from the SDECE Action Service went to Toulon then Collioure, before joining the Aspretto base near Ajaccio in 1960, where the Combat Divers Training Centre (CINC) was formed. For over twenty years, they led port and military installation reconnaissance operations in hostile countries, taking part in clandestine operations all over the world. Following the failure of the Rainbow Warrior operation, the CINC left Corsica and moved to Brittany.
Cold War
DGSE - MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Psychological warfare
The concept of psychological warfare appeared in the early 20th century with the emergence of «total war» during the First World War: the separation between combatants and non-combatants became increasingly difficult and the civil population played a major role in the conflict. Psychological warfare, which uses manipulation, propaganda and misinformation techniques to act on people’s minds, aims to boost the morale of the troops and the civil population, while undermining that of the enemy. During the Second World War, the psychological actions conducted by the British and the Americans were mainly designed to deceive the German military chiefs about the Allies’ true intentions and the embarkation locations in Italy and France, but also to arouse in the German population a feeling of defeatism, weariness with war and a loss of confidence in their leaders.
During the Cold War between the Americans and the Soviets, psychological warfare played a major, continuous role. Each of the two camps tried to defend and propagate their own ideology and values, to the detriment of the other. The KGB used a multitude of influential agents to spread Communist ideas in authorised environments and, in Western Europe, manipulated vast popular peace and anti-nuclear weapon movements. The CIA, meanwhile, financed anti-Communist organisations in the West and disseminated propaganda broadcasts in the East, to counter the influence and expansion of Communism.
––––––––––––––––––––––––
By their very nature, secret war operations must remain unknown to the public. Sometimes, however, due to chance and/or errors in the conception or execution of these enterprises, their failure is exposed and events take a spectacular, resounding turn. The media seizes hold of it, the political classes debate it and public opinion is stirred up by it, up to a certain point at least. In several famous cases, all very different in origin and scope, scandals have been caused by immediate or subsequent revelations, such as the British «Cambridge Spy Ring», the American «Bay of Pigs Invasion» or the French «Rainbow Warrior». Even in the Soviet Union, where information was controlled by a totalitarian regime, the Stalinist paranoia about espionage and betrayal resulted in repeated scandals, widely reported by the official media.
From the shadows into the light, secrets revealed
––––––––––––––––––––––––By their very nature, secret war operations must remain unknown to the public. Sometimes, however, due to chance and/or errors in the conception or execution of these enterprises, their failure is exposed and events take a spectacular, resounding turn. The media seizes hold of it, the political classes debate it and public opinion is stirred up by it, up to a certain point at least. In several famous cases, all very different in origin and scope, scandals have been caused by immediate or subsequent revelations, such as the British «Cambridge Spy Ring», the American «Bay of Pigs Invasion» or the French «Rainbow Warrior». Even in the Soviet Union, where information was controlled by a totalitarian regime, the Stalinist paranoia about espionage and betrayal resulted in repeated scandals, widely reported by the official media.
By contrast, successful operations stay in the shadows. We have to wait until the main players withdraw or disappear, or publish their memoirs, or for historians to cross-match their research following normal (according to legal declassification periods) or exceptional opening of the archives (following the collapse of the apparatus of State or the regimes in question), to obtain a more completed, nuanced, balanced view of events. This is the only way that ordinary citizens can learn, for example, about the successful British «Ultra» operation, the American «Venona» project, the French «Farewell» dossier or the Soviet «Stockholm Appeal»... The light emerges from the shadows.
falsified letter from the Italian military attaché Panizzardi to the German military attaché Schwarzkoppen, called "Fake Henry"
Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense
© Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense
Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense
© Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense
––––––––––––––––––––––––
The exhibition does not make any revelations about affairs or operations. This is not its purpose, nor is it able to do this. However, at the end of the exhibition, it shows the different ways in which affairs have been revealed to the public: through the media at the time, usually when the operation has failed, or years later, in the memoirs of the people involved.
Operation Gold
On 25 April 1956, the front page of the DDR daily paper Neues Deutschland exposed Operation Gold. This operation, conducted by the CIA and MI6 to spy on the Soviet authorities communications, consisted in digging a tunnel under their occupation zone in Berlin. In reality, the operation had been revealed to the Soviets in 1954 by George Blake, the British spy to the USSR. The Soviets had decided not to act, in order to use the tunnel to misinform the CIA and MI6.
Affairs exposed in the media
––––––––––––––––––––––––The exhibition does not make any revelations about affairs or operations. This is not its purpose, nor is it able to do this. However, at the end of the exhibition, it shows the different ways in which affairs have been revealed to the public: through the media at the time, usually when the operation has failed, or years later, in the memoirs of the people involved.
Operation Gold
On 25 April 1956, the front page of the DDR daily paper Neues Deutschland exposed Operation Gold. This operation, conducted by the CIA and MI6 to spy on the Soviet authorities communications, consisted in digging a tunnel under their occupation zone in Berlin. In reality, the operation had been revealed to the Soviets in 1954 by George Blake, the British spy to the USSR. The Soviets had decided not to act, in order to use the tunnel to misinform the CIA and MI6.
The Cambridge Five
On 18 November 1979, the front page of the British weekly paper, The Observer, announced that the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had revealed the identity of the «fourth Cambridge spy» to the House of Commons. In fact, the British secret services had identified Anthony Blunt, artistic adviser to the Queen, in 1964, but had not wanted to make the affair public.
The Farewell Affair
On 6 April 1983, the front page of the French daily paper Le Monde announced the expulsion of 47 Soviet diplomats from French territory. This expulsion followed revelations by Vladimir Vetrov, alias Farewell, a KGB officer, whose name and pseudonym were not mentioned in the paper as they were not known to the media. Disillusioned with the lack of recognition from a regime in which he no longer believed, he decided to make contact with the French Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) in 1980. Vetrov delivered 3,000 microfilm documents to the DST and CIA, revealing the USSR’s weaknesses and the worldwide list of Soviet infiltrators. Identified by the KGB, he was executed on 23 January 1985.
Tais-toi (Shut up) (in French and Arabic), a French propaganda poster warning against civil espionage
Lithography on card. Second World War / Anonymous
© Contemporary International
Lithography on card. Second World War / Anonymous
© Contemporary International
––––––––––––––––––––––––
Angleton, who had an American father and a Mexican mother, was a Harvard law graduate who joined the army in 1943. Recruited by the newly created OSS, he was assigned to branch X-2, responsible for counterespionage and inspired by the British model, in order to ensure the protection of the Ultra decoding operation, in close liaison with the SOE. Sent to Rome in 1944 to direct the Italian X-2 unit, he stayed in Italy after 1945 and, when the CIA was founded in 1947, was put in charge of local operations: tracking down Nazi and Fascist agents, giving the agency’s support to Christian-Democrat candidates against the Communists in the 1948 general elections, or preparing the «staybehind» Italian network, Gladio. In 1954, he was appointed as the CIA’s first Director of Counterespionage, working in particular with the Israeli services. After the Soviet defector Anatoli Golitsyne persuaded him that the CIA was largely infiltrated by the KGB, Angleton’s suspicion of his colleagues veered towards paranoia. In 1974, he was relieved of most of his duties by the new CIA Director, William Colby.
Portraits of spies
––––––––––––––––––––––––James Jesus Angleton (1917-1987)
Angleton, who had an American father and a Mexican mother, was a Harvard law graduate who joined the army in 1943. Recruited by the newly created OSS, he was assigned to branch X-2, responsible for counterespionage and inspired by the British model, in order to ensure the protection of the Ultra decoding operation, in close liaison with the SOE. Sent to Rome in 1944 to direct the Italian X-2 unit, he stayed in Italy after 1945 and, when the CIA was founded in 1947, was put in charge of local operations: tracking down Nazi and Fascist agents, giving the agency’s support to Christian-Democrat candidates against the Communists in the 1948 general elections, or preparing the «staybehind» Italian network, Gladio. In 1954, he was appointed as the CIA’s first Director of Counterespionage, working in particular with the Israeli services. After the Soviet defector Anatoli Golitsyne persuaded him that the CIA was largely infiltrated by the KGB, Angleton’s suspicion of his colleagues veered towards paranoia. In 1974, he was relieved of most of his duties by the new CIA Director, William Colby.
Lavrenti Pavlovitch Beria (1899-1953)
After completing technical studies, Beria, originally from Mingrelia in Georgia, joined the Bolsheviks in 1919. He worked in the secret police in Georgia, then in Transcaucasia. Noticed by Stalin in 1931-1932, he replaced Ejov at the head of the NKVD in 1938; under his authority, the reign of terror continued, but in a more selective way. He assassinated Trotsky, in exile, in August 1940. From September 1945, he successfully coordinated Soviet atomic espionage, but was removed as head of the NKVD in December 1945. Although threatened by Stalin in 1951-1953, on Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, he became the USSR number two. His powers and activism concerned his comrades: arrested on 26 June, he was, it seems, executed on 23 December 1953.
Georges-Jean Painvin (1886-1980)
Georges Painvin was a polytechnical school graduate and Professor of palaeontology at the Ecole des Mines in Paris in 1914. As an orderly under General Maunoury during World War I, he helped a cryptoanalytical officer decode German telegrams. Assigned to the «Cabinet Noir» (decoding room) in 1915, he managed to break every successive German code. His most famous exploit took place on 1 June 1918, during a full German offensive. After weeks of hard work, Painvin broke the ADFGX code, but then a telegram was intercepted with a new code: ADFGVX. After two days and one night of solid work, he finally cracked it. The decoding of this «Victory radiogram» indicated the place and date of a new, dangerous enemy attack, which could then be repelled. It was not until half a century later that his role, which had been protected by secrecy, was revealed to the public.
John-Henry Bevan (1894-1978)
A member of the British upper class, a former pupil at Eton and Oxford graduate, John Bevan first became involved in misinformation at the end of the First World War when, as an Army officer, he analysed intelligence with an acuity that was noted by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. Recalled by the government in 1939, he was assigned to MI5 and made responsible for the London Controlling Section (LCS) in June 1942. His mission was to devise misinformation and destabilisation operations, which other services then coordinated and executed. His greatest success was Operation Bodyguard, devised as part of the Normandy landings, intended to deceive the German authorities about Allied movements in 1944. His achievements and the extent of his role during the war were not revealed until the 1970s, with the opening of the archives and the publication of The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 by John C. Masterman in 1972.
Jeanne Bohec (1919-2010)
On 18 June 1940, Jeanne Bohec, a young chemist’s assistant in the Brest powder works, left France and reached England. In London, she volunteered for the French Free Forces. Initially employed as a secretary, she then worked as a chemist in an explosive manufacturing laboratory alongside BCRA agents. In September 1943 she underwent sabotage instruction training. After being parachuted into France in early March 1944, near Alençon, she taught sabotage techniques and how to make explosives and incendiary bombs to FFI Resistance fighters. The day after the Normandy landings, she joined the Saint-Marcel Resistance and reached Great Britain at the end of August 1944.